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THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE 
Social Science 
SOME WAR AND POST WAR PROBLEMS 
GEOGRAPHY OF THE PACIFIC WAR 
GEo. H. PRIMivIER 
State Teachers Colle_qe, Duluth 
ABSTRACT 
Three major routes to ·Japan lead across the major ocean, still 
ironically termed "Pacific." The shortest San Francisco-Yokohama 
route, some 4,'500 miles, skirts the foggy northern margin; it exceeds 
by well over 1,000 miles the New York-London route arching north-
ward in the Atlantic. Distance, low visibility, slow fouling of vessels, 
and automatic cleaning of hulls when warships enter the glacier-
derived waters of our northern inlets all favor this route for even-
tual attack upon Japan. 
A second route, 1,000 miles longer than the first, passes Honolulu 
and Midway Island. A third, and yet longer route, extends south-
west from Honolulu, thence west by way of New Guinea and north-
ern Australia. The short northern route takes travelers well north 
of the latitude of Duluth; the second lies partly south of Tropic of 
Cancer; and the third leads its users well south of the equator. 
The Pacific comprises about half the earth's salt water area; it 
measures approximately twice Atlantic size. No earlier war involved 
such a tremendous battlefield or necessitated such grand scale 
planning. 
Acquisition of Alaska, happily flanking much of the northern 
route to Japan, did not please all statesmen of the time. We value 
Alaska now for the minerals, furs, and other commodities currently 
produced, but more as a site for advanced bases: Anchorage, Fair-
banks, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor. The 1,500 mile overland, inland 
route from end-of-steel near Ft. St. John may help us hold Alaska 
and supply U.S.S.R. even should sea control be strongly disputed or 
lost. 
Just beyond Alaska lie insular and peninsular portions of Siberia 
coveted by us as taking-off places from which to bomb Japan. We 
hope Siberia, with its recently expanded population and recently 
tripled area of cultivated land, can defend her territory if attacked. 
Oil, aluminum, and manganese might give Asiatic Russia some dif-
ficulty; not likely iron, copper, lead, gold, zinc, and coal. Kuznetz 
Basin, some 2,000 miles from German and Japanese frontiers, con-
tributes half of Siberia's 40,000,000 tons of coal; the only Siberian 
mines under immediate threat, mines producing about one-third 
Kuznetz tonnage, lie in Vladivostok area. These mines form a par-
tial invitation to Japanese conquest, but U.S.S.R. likely would not 
attack Japan with her railway north of Lake Baikal unfinished. 
PROCEEDINGS, VOLUME TEN, 194~ 43 
With Japanese increasin•g conquest our trade dwindles: soybeans 
from Manchuria and tung oil, dried eggs, and coarse carpet wool 
from China proper. Even tungsten shipments disappeared with 
closure of the Burma Road. From the Philippines we no longer 
absorb agricultural surpluses of tobacco, sugar, abaca (manila 
hemp), and coconut products, the latter two of which have im-
portant war uses. We also lost a source of manganese and of chro-
mite; copper and iron represent lesser losses but Japan made four 
significant gains. 
In cutting us off from the hot humid lands producing some 98% 
of all our rubber imports Japan dealt us a body blow; by the end 
of 1944 probably three-fourths of civilian owned pneumatic-tired 
vehicles will lie dormant. Synthetic rubber, in which ,ve stand a 
poorer third to Germany than she does a second to Russia, holds 
little promise for civilians till 1945. We are not quite so nearly 
severed from sources of tin but Bolivia can supply but a minor part 
of our ordinary consumption. 
Perhaps we may deny ourselves pepper with little inconven-
ience; nearly all commercial pepper is derived from Nether lands 
Indies. Loss of oil resources of the same islands weakens but does 
not stagger United Nations; demolition likely prevented much of 
positive gain to the Japanese. Tankers and reserve oil from other 
sources must supply United Nations forces in Australia. 
Most plantation supplies of quinine and of kapok, both largely 
Javanese, can no longer be drawn upon by non-Axis peoples. Ca-
shew nuts, jute, and tea can not so readily come from India. The 
war must work great hardship on thousands of Japanese farmers 
for well over ninety per cent of our recent silk imports originated 
there. 
The relatively insignificant number of Japanese in our Pacific 
border states equal but a tiny fraction of one of the major cities 
closely spread qver southern Hondo, main Japanese island. Conden-
sation of major war industries here makes for efficient bombing 
whenever United Nations choose to attack. Island plants should be 
devastated before time elapses for Japan. to c.onstruct new plants 
on the mainland. 
Nine fast bomber hours from San Francisco, stands our Pacific 
outpost acqu.ired in 1883 .. The deep, spacious, intricate inlet indent-
ing the coast of Oahu ten miles, we since term Pearl Harbor. An 
enemy in force passes at great risk east of Hawaii to approach our 
coast Panama to Alaska. Guam and Wake, within striking distance 
of Japanese communications and power lines, were early, but we 
hope temporary, losses. 
Despite great area and great distances we shall come again to 
command the Pacific. Eventually, we can cut supply lines to out-
posts recently taken by Japan; having retaken the outposts, we can, 
in tun'l, bring our enemy to terms and again 'have our share of the 
desirable goods of the Orient- properly shared, we trust, with our 
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onetime enemies. Paraphrasing the remark of a famous Englishman, 
-having met disaster like men, may we meet success like gentle-
men. 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
,JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
R.rcHARD D. VI/EIGLis 
Carleton College 
In an address before the American Historical Association in 1940. 
Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, advanced 
the l;ypothesis that Japan had adopted the externals of western 
material civilization, while maintaining unchanged the essential 
core of her ancient culture. Japanese thought and behavior pat-
terns still follow the established traditions, and the Japanese in 
the privacy of his home is a totally different person from the Jap-
anese business man· in his office or shop, for example. W esterniza-
tion, then, has penetrated to no real depth the life of the Japanese 
nation. 
Dr. Ru's observation suggests an interesting approach to the 
problem of the basic conflict between Japan and the United Nations 
which burst into open warfare with the attack on Pearl Harbor 
December 7, 1941. The question which it raises is whether Japan 
on the one hand and the United Nations on the other had yet 
reached the point where they sufficiently understood the psychologi-
cal functionings, the thought processes, and the motivating ideas of 
each other. It will be the thesis of this brief paper that the present 
conflict is a result, in part at least, of this divergence in cultures; 
and also of two other basic issues - the matter of race superiority 
and inferiority, and the clash of vital national policies. 
The intangible divergence in mental processes is well illustrated 
by the f91lowing quotation from the .Tapan times weekly for Octo-
ber rn, 1939: 
At the outbreak of the China affair, Japan tried to present her 
case before the world in a simple and straight-forward manner. Yet, 
some of the Powers not only refused to listen, denouncing whatever · 
Japan stated as "propaganda" in its sinister aspects and shoving it 
aside, but obligingly went to the extent of hurling slanderous· re-
marks and insulting comments. Japan remai_ned stoically silent in 
the face of this calumny, certain in belief that those Powers would 
realize their own folly sooner or later. 
Such protestations of injured self-righteousness are utterly incom-
prehensible to the western mind. This and other Japanese state-
ments seem so completely at variance with the logic of the facts 
that the western reader is amused at Japanese duplicity and naivete. 
One writer,.however, answers that to the Japanese this is not pre-
